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Tethering the FCC: 
The Case Against Chevron Deference for Jurisdictional Claims 
 
by 
 
Daniel A. Lyons* 
 
Despite the Administration‟s recent rhetoric about regulatory review,1 regulation and re-
regulation seems destined to be a primary theme of President Obama‟s first term. From 
the financial markets and consumer lending to the health care industry, the President 
and Congress have enacted statutes designed to curb what they saw as prior 
Administrations‟ deregulatory excesses. The Federal Communications Commission has 
been an eager participant in this regulatory and re-regulatory wave: since 2009, under 
Chairman Genachowski's leadership, the agency has adopted several new initiatives, 
ranging from a proposal to regulate set-top box video navigation devices to various 
measures to regulate wireless services. Perhaps most significantly and controversially, 
the Commission has imposed new net neutrality regulatory mandates on broadband 
Internet providers. As this paper shows, the FCC's new regulatory initiatives stretch the 
boundaries of the Commission‟s jurisdiction under the Communications Act and ought 
not to be accorded Chevron deference upon judicial review. 
 
Unlike its counterparts at the SEC or Health and Human Services, the FCC is 
expanding its jurisdiction without a clear congressional mandate. The distinction is 
important because the telecommunications world has changed dramatically since 
Congress last overhauled the Communications Act in 1996—an overhaul that was 
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largely deregulatory in focus and intent, if not always in practical effect. This 
jurisdictional freelancing by the FCC is familiar to veterans of past telecommunications 
policy battles, in particular the Commission‟s efforts to regulate the cable industry. The 
Commission initially foreswore any jurisdiction over cable, but as the industry expanded, 
the agency used its so-called “ancillary authority” to foist a labyrinthine set of rules on 
cable operators. The Supreme Court upheld certain rules but ultimately determined that 
the agency lacked the authority to regulate the industry comprehensively without a clear 
grant of authority from Congress.2 Thus far, the Commission‟s efforts to impose net 
neutrality regulation have met a similar fate.3 
 
This history, and the Commission‟s current push to expand its jurisdiction, highlight an 
important but often ignored tension in administrative law. The Chevron doctrine 
generally requires courts to defer to an agency‟s interpretation of ambiguous language 
in a statute that the agency administers.4 Chevron is premised on the assumption that 
agencies, not courts, should “fill any gap left . . . by Congress” in the agency‟s organic 
statute.5 But it strains the doctrine to apply Chevron to an agency‟s conclusions about 
the scope of its jurisdiction. In these cases, the agency is not merely filling a gap within 
a statutory framework, but is instead defining the outer limits of that framework. There is 
a difference in kind between the policy question “what rules should govern broadband?” 
and the legal question “does the Communications Act allow the Commission to make 
rules governing broadband?” Courts appropriately defer to agency expertise when 
answering the former question, but should reserve the latter question for “the province . 
. . of the judicial department.”6 
 
In the telecommunications context, courts have often viewed the Commission‟s efforts 
to expand its jurisdiction with skepticism, even though they have not reconciled their 
decisions with Chevron‟s seeming grant of near-plenary authority to agencies in such 
matters. This judicial skepticism is well-grounded. Chevron extends only to questions 
that Congress intended the agency to resolve. The nondelegation doctrine should 
prohibit Congress from delegating to the agency the power to determine its own 
jurisdiction. Agencies are designed to resolve policy questions, and are predisposed to 
find jurisdiction when they feel, as a matter of policy, that regulation would be useful. 
 
The overwhelming statutory evidence suggests that Congress has not (yet) intended to 
give the agency general regulatory authority over broadband Internet services, no 
matter how much (as a policy matter) the Commission feels it needs this authority. It 
would be a mistake for courts to defer to the agency‟s conclusion otherwise because of 
a misappropriation of the Chevron doctrine. Therefore, as the Commission‟s net 
neutrality project winds its way through the judicial system, courts should not hesitate to 
review independently whether the agency‟s efforts remain within the Communications 
Act‟s confines. 
 
Chevron and Congressional Intent 
 
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether Chevron should extend to 
agency jurisdictional claims. In the doctrine‟s early days, Justice Brennan argued that 
deference is inappropriate when interpreting statutes that “confine the scope of [an 
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agency‟s] jurisdiction.”7 His argument hinges on the fact that Chevron applies only to 
statutes that Congress has “entrusted [the agency] to administer”—and agencies do not 
“administer” statutes that confine their jurisdiction.8 Justice Scalia responded that one 
cannot meaningfully distinguish between jurisdictional statutes and those that authorize 
an agency to administer authority entrusted to it.9 This is consistent with Justice Scalia‟s 
general view that Chevron deference should govern any interpretation of an agency‟s 
organic statute that reflects the agency‟s “authoritative” position.10 
 
While Justice Scalia is correct that the line between “jurisdictional” and “policy” 
questions is somewhat murky, his argument goes too far. In United States v. Mead,11 
the Court explained that Chevron deference stems primarily from congressional intent. 
As Professor Cass Sunstein has written, “[c]ourts defer to agency interpretations of law 
when, and because, Congress has told them to do so.”12 With respect to jurisdictional 
claims however, the very question presented is whether Congress intended the 
agency‟s authority to extend as far as the agency seeks. Professors Ernest Gellhorn 
and Paul Verkuil explain that “[t]he more significant the question and the greater the 
impact that expansion of the agency‟s jurisdiction is likely to have, the greater the 
likelihood that Congress did not intend implicitly to delegate that determination to an 
agency.”13 
 
If, as Mead suggests, Chevron deference stems from congressional intent, then it is 
somewhat illogical to extend this deference to an agency‟s conclusions regarding its 
jurisdictional limits: it would imply that Congress intended the agency to determine what 
Congress intended. This circularity illustrates the distinction between jurisdictional 
claims and the more routine policy questions that lie at Chevron‟s core. Once the scope 
of an agency‟s jurisdiction is determined, it may be wholly appropriate to defer to the 
agency‟s efforts to fill gaps in the agency‟s organic statute, if Congress intended the 
agency to do so. But such policy questions are different in kind from the question of 
where Congress intended the outer limits of the statute to be. Before a court defers to 
an agency‟s conclusion as to the best way to regulate a service, it should satisfy itself 
that Congress has told it to do so, by independently determining whether the agency 
has jurisdiction over the service. 
 
Nondelegation Concerns 
 
Of course, one could argue that Congress did indeed intend the agency itself to 
determine the scope of its jurisdiction. Telecommunications would seem to be a field 
where Congress would find “dynamic statutory interpretation” useful: technology 
changes so rapidly that Congress may intend the Commission to remain nimble and 
flexible, by allowing it to determine its own jurisdiction. But a self-defining jurisdictional 
scheme would run afoul of the principles underlying the nondelegation doctrine. 
 
The nondelegation doctrine prevents Congress from delegating the legislative power to 
another branch of government, and in the process assures that Congress, not agencies, 
decide basic, critical policy choices.14 As the Court has explained, the doctrine “is rooted 
in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system of 
government.”15 The Constitution vests Congress alone with the power to make laws 
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because of its unique position as an elected deliberative body. “„Therefore the integrity 
and maintenance of [that] system of government ordained by the Constitution‟ mandate 
that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another Branch.”16  
 
Beyond mere formalism, there are strong policy reasons why the legislative power 
should not be delegated to agencies. First, Congress is politically accountable in a way 
that agencies are not. While agencies are indirectly politically accountable, in the sense 
that they work for an elected president, this noisy signaling mechanism is not a 
substitute for the direct access that citizens have to their representatives. Political 
accountability requires the legislative process to be more open to public inspection than 
rulemaking at many agencies. Moreover, legislation must go through the constitutionally 
mandated process of bicameralism and presentment. By requiring a bill to pass both 
houses of Congress and the President before becoming effective, the legislative 
process divides the legislative power and makes it more difficult for particular interest 
groups to “capture” the rulemaking process for private gain.17 The process also 
encourages a measure of deliberation and restraint in rulemaking, assuring “that the 
legislative power would be exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate in 
separate settings.”18 
 
These safeguards should seem particularly significant to students of 
telecommunications, as the FCC has a reputation for somewhat dysfunctional 
operation. As Professor Phillip Weiser has noted, the Commission has, in the past, 
developed a reputation for being unduly influenced by special interests—former 
Chairman Reed Hundt once suggested that FCC stood for “Firmly Captured by 
Corporations.”19 The D.C. Circuit has chastised the agency for relying heavily on ex 
parte proceedings rather than notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, which 
permits well-connected special interests to wield undue influence over agency 
procedures.20 The court stated that “[e]ven the possibility that there is here one 
administrative record for the public and this court and another for the Commission and 
those „in the know‟ is intolerable.”21 Finally, critics have chided the Commission for ad-
hoc decision-making rather than deliberate, reasoned strategic planning, a reputation 
that the agency is consciously trying to overcome.22   
 
Unfortunately, while the nondelegation doctrine has strong formal and functional 
rationales that would appeal to the Commission‟s critics in particular, the Court has 
found the doctrine notoriously hard to enforce. As the Mistretta Court explained, “in our 
increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, 
Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad 
general directives.”23 Yet the Court refuses to abandon nondelegation principles 
altogether: it has used the nondelegation doctrine as a canon of statutory construction, 
to narrow the scope of a statute that would otherwise raise a serious nondelegation 
question.24 These tea leaves suggest the Court still takes seriously the principles 
underlying the nondelegation doctrine, even if it struggles to apply the doctrine itself to 
individual cases. 
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Midwest Video II, the 1979 Supreme Court decision that struck down certain FCC cable 
regulations, reflected strong nondelegation themes. The Court emphasized that 
“[t]hough afforded wide latitude in its supervision over communication by wire, the 
Commission was not delegated unrestrained authority” under the Communications 
Act.25 The Court also acknowledged that its prior cable-related decisions only 
“cautiously” recognized the Commission‟s efforts to regulate cable and stressed that 
those regulations “strain[ed] the outer limits” of its jurisdiction.26 Specifically, the Court 
held that the Commission could regulate cable only if the regulation was reasonably 
ancillary to its statutorily mandated responsibilities to regulate broadcasting or the 
telephone. It rejected the Commission‟s efforts to impose a common carriage-like 
regime on cable because the regime was inconsistent with Section 3(h), which 
protected the editorial discretion of broadcasters. Importantly, the Court rejected the 
Commission‟s assertion that because Section 3(h) applied only to broadcasters, it 
imposed no limitations on cable companies: “without reference to the provisions of the 
Act directly governing broadcasting, the Commission‟s [ancillary] jurisdiction . . . would 
be unbounded.”27 In the process, the court rejected the agency‟s broad interpretation of 
an ambiguous statutory phrase, and instead interpreted the statute in a way that 
avoided an unlimited delegation of authority over cable.  
 
The D.C. Circuit‟s recent Comcast decision, which struck the Commission‟s first attempt 
to impose net neutrality-like restrictions on broadband providers, sounded a similar 
theme. First, the court rejected the Commission‟s claim to an unbounded general power 
to regulate broadband service under Title I: while the Supreme Court had previously 
implied, at least in dicta,  that Title I could allow the agency to impose some regulations 
on cable broadband, this does not mean that the agency has “plenary authority over 
such providers.”28 It also rejected the Commission‟s claim that general statements of 
congressional policy were sufficient to support the Commission‟s jurisdiction over 
broadband, because such statements are not delegations of regulatory authority.29 
Extending the Commission‟s ancillary authority based upon such broad, nonbinding 
statements “would virtually free the Commission from its congressional tether.”30 If 
accepted, the Commission would be free to enact the same requirements on Internet 
service providers that the Commission places on telephone service, broadcasting, or 
cable services, without any direction from Congress to do so. The court explained that if 
Midwest Video II exceeded the outer limits of the Commission‟s jurisdiction, this claim 
“seeks to shatter them entirely.”31 
 
In both cases, the reviewing court rejected the Commission‟s broad jurisdictional claim 
at least in part because of nondelegation-flavored concerns about boundless agency 
regulatory authority. Although complainants did not raise a nondelegation challenge, 
and the court has famously upheld the Communications Act‟s charge to regulate in the 
“public interest” as a sufficiently intelligible principle,32 both Midwest Video II and 
Comcast express concern that the agency must remain tethered to specific statutory 
directives rather than be permitted the broad authority of a roaming telecommunications 
lawgiver. Given the important constitutional and policy provisions underpinning the 
doctrine, this skepticism about agency claims to broad jurisdiction is both expected and 
welcome, even against the backdrop of a general deference toward agency 
interpretations of its organic statute. 
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Institutional Competence 
 
Professor Elizabeth Foote highlights another reason why courts should differentiate 
between jurisdictional and policymaking questions. Foote notes that agencies and 
courts are fundamentally different institutions, with institutional strengths and 
weaknesses tailored toward performing different functions.33 Courts are dispassionate 
and neutral arbiters of the law, designed to carefully weigh both sides of a legal 
argument and decide impartially what the law is. By comparison, agencies are public 
bureaucracies charged with “carrying out” Congress‟s statutory schemes.34 Unlike 
courts, agencies perform an “operational, policy-implementing role” by “choos[ing] from 
among a variety of possible solutions to a particular set of specialized problems or 
challenges.”35 When doing so, agencies do not mimic the court‟s dispassionate 
neutrality when divining Congress‟s intent in a particular case. On the contrary, 
agencies act with a particular (often politically-motivated) goal in mind, rely on their own 
expert judgments, and remain cognizant of accountability to the political branches.36 
Agency alchemy synthesizes “law, politics, expertise and management” into a policy 
prescription in a way that courts could not, and should not, attempt to imitate.37 
 
Looking at each institution‟s comparative strengths, courts are better positioned to 
answer the legal question of where Congress set the boundary of an agency‟s 
jurisdiction.38 The Administrative Procedure Act expressly instructs courts to “decide all 
relevant questions of law” and “interpret . . . statutory provisions,” and further instructs 
reviewing courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action” found to be “in excess of 
statutory jurisdiction.”39 Defining the jurisdictional limits of an agency‟s organic statute is 
a quintessential legal question, involving the use of traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation to find fixed meaning in a statutory text.  Deferring to the agency‟s own 
conclusion regarding its jurisdiction replaces dispassionate legal analysis with a process 
that is consciously “mission oriented and politically directed.”40 Such deference is wholly 
appropriate when determining which of two legitimate policy objectives the agency 
should adopt, but it is misplaced when applied to more basic legal questions of the 
scope of an agency‟s authority. 
 
Political Accountability 
 
Finally, courts may view the jurisdictional claims of independent agencies such as the 
Commission with particular skepticism, because independent agencies are less 
politically accountable. As Randolph May, President of the Free State Foundation, has 
noted in earlier Perspectives entries and elsewhere, 41 the Chevron Court was 
motivated in part by the fact that “federal judges—who have no constituency—have a 
duty to respect the legitimate policy choices made by those who do.”42 This political 
accountability rationale appears often in both cases and academic literature discussing 
Chevron. Justice Kagan, for example, has noted the rise in presidential involvement in 
the daily operations of executive agencies, and has suggested that Chevron deference 
be “link[ed]” to such presidential involvement to encourage greater political “control as 
mitigating the potential threat that administrative discretion poses.”43 This logic suggests 
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that courts should be less deferential to the conclusions drawn by independent 
agencies, which are structurally designed to be insulated from executive political 
control.  
 
This lack of political accountability weighs especially strongly in the context of 
jurisdictional questions. The Progressive-Era Congresses shielded the FCC and other 
independent agencies from political influence so they could bring their professional 
expertise to bear on important questions without fear of being corrupted by politics.44 Of 
course, no question is more important to an agency than the scope of its authority. But 
when answering such questions an agency is susceptible to corruption of a different 
sort—the temptation to maximize influence and aggrandize power. A broad Chevron 
doctrine would limit the Court‟s ability to rein in wayward agencies that succumb to this 
natural temptation. As Justice Kagan notes, this is usually not a fatal flaw because a 
strong President will discipline agencies that overreach in ways that generate a political 
backlash.45 But the President‟s power over independent agencies has been intentionally 
blunted, making the Executive a less useful check on overreaching independent 
agencies. This logic suggests the need for less deference to an independent agency‟s 
jurisdictional claims, which would allow the Court to discipline agencies that the 
President is unable to reach. 
 
Identifying and Deciding Agency Jurisdictional Claims 
 
But what of Justice Scalia‟s observation that it is difficult to differentiate between the 
questions of whether an agency can regulate a service and whether the agency‟s 
choice among policy alternatives is permissible? After all, courts may find it difficult to 
decide at the margin whether (for example) the question presented in Comcast is best 
understood as a legal question of the agency‟s jurisdiction to act, or a policy question of 
whether net neutrality is appropriate, particularly given that Chevron does not carefully 
distinguish between the two. Ultimately, however, the fact that a legal inquiry is hard 
should not alone constitute a reason to abandon it. There is no reason why 
distinguishing between jurisdictional and policy questions presents any more difficult a 
challenge for the judiciary than ascertaining whether a particular action is an 
“unreasonable search” or any other difficult constitutional standard. The “hydraulic 
pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its 
power” is no less prevalent in administrative agencies, and both constitutional and 
policy concerns demand that this pressure “be resisted.”46  
 
While it may be challenging to identify jurisdictional questions that lay beyond Chevron‟s 
scope, the Mead Court suggests both the need and the pathway to do so. In any given 
case involving a statutory interpretation question, the Court should ask whether the 
issue presents a question as to the agency‟s jurisdiction. However, this inquiry is simply 
one species of the broader inquiry that Mead demands of all such cases: before the 
Court defers to the agency‟s interpretation, how can it be sure that Congress meant for 
the agency to issue rules on this topic that carry the force of law?47  
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Naturally, the most obvious indication of congressional intent is the statute itself: do the 
words Congress chose indicate clearly that it intends agency jurisdiction to extend to the 
subject at issue? The clearer and more specific Congress‟s jurisdictional grant is, the 
easier it is to conclude that it intended the agency to issue rules on the topic with the 
force of law. But where, as is typical, the statute is unclear or broad, the Court must 
draw upon other tools of statutory interpretation. Such tools could include the larger 
context in which the specific jurisdictional grant appears, the purpose of the statute as a 
whole, or perhaps the statute‟s legislative history. 
 
Other decisions suggest that the Court should also look at the “importance” of the 
agency‟s proposed course of action, compared to the statute from which the agency 
claims its jurisdiction. The more significant or monumental the agency‟s action is, the 
more evidence the Court should require that Congress meant the agency to act in this 
sphere. In MCI v. AT&T, for example, the Court rejected the FCC‟s claim that its 
authority to “modify” tariff filings included the power to excuse all non-dominant 
telephone companies from the tariff requirement: tariff filings were an integral part of the 
Act‟s rate-regulation regime, and the Court simply did not believe that Congress gave 
the agency discretion to eliminate the carefully-designed rate regulation regime through 
so benign a word as “modify.”48 Similarly, in FDA v. Brown & Williamson, the Court 
recognized that tobacco is a significant and controversial industry whose regulation 
presents many politically-charged questions. It therefore rejected the agency‟s claim 
that tobacco fell under the agency‟s authority to regulate “drugs” and “devices,” even 
though the statutory language could have been read as doing so.49  
 
Finally, as Professors Gellhorn and Verkuil note, one way to determine whether the 
agency‟s proposed regulation presents a jurisdictional question is how far the regulation 
strays from the agency‟s “core regulatory assignment.”50 If an agency has not previously 
regulated a product or service, or asserted jurisdiction to do so, congressional intent to 
regulate is less likely to be found. The same is true the less the product or service 
resembles those things that the agency does regulate. The more the agency strays from 
its jurisdictional core, the more evidence is required before concluding that Congress 
intended the agency to reach as far as it seeks to.51  
 
Skidmore and the Jurisdictional Inquiry 
 
Of course, while the agency‟s jurisdictional claims do not warrant Chevron deference, 
this does not “place [the agency‟s action] outside the pale of any deference whatever.”52 
Under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., “an agency's interpretation may merit some deference 
whatever its form, given the „specialized experience and broader investigations and 
information‟ available to the agency.”53 “The fair measure of deference to an agency 
administering its own statute has been understood to vary with circumstances, and 
courts have looked to the degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and 
relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency's position.”54  
 
The agency remains an expert in the administration of its organic statute and its views 
regarding the breadth of the statute and its extension to the service in question may 
warrant some deference. Skidmore allows the court to take these views into account but 
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without mechanically giving this opinion the substantial deference owed under Chevron. 
Skidmore allows the court to determine the extent to which the agency‟s views are a 
product of its expertise and to discount those views to the extent they reflect the 
agency‟s self-interest in aggrandizing power to itself. It also allows the court to 
determine independently the extent to which the agency‟s legal conclusion regarding its 
jurisdiction is colored by its policy conclusion that regulation is necessary or beneficial to 
society.  
 
Determining the Commission’s Authority to Regulate Broadband 
 
The above framework yields important insights as the Commission turns its attention to 
the next phase in telecommunications regulation. First and foremost, courts should 
continue to recognize that the Commission remains the nation‟s foremost authority on 
telecommunications and should continue to accord deference to reasonable policy 
decisions that are clearly within the scope of the agency‟s authority. Yet courts should 
not be afraid to scrutinize claims by the Commission that expand its jurisdiction or that 
effect dramatic departures from its historical core regulatory duties. A court ultimately 
may find that such expansion is permissible under the Act but constitutional and 
institutional concerns demand that this scrutiny be performed without Chevron‟s 
customary thumb on the scale of agency deference. 
 
More specifically, the D.C. Circuit was correct to scrutinize closely the Commission‟s 
attempt to regulate Comcast‟s network management practices.55 The agency claimed 
near-plenary authority to regulate broadband providers under Title I and under general 
statements of Congressional policy. But while Title I generally gives the FCC jurisdiction 
over “communication by wire or radio,” a statutory grant that would seem to encompass 
broadband service, this broad interpretation is inconsistent with the structure of the Act 
as a whole.56 Titles II, III, and VI, governing telecommunications service, broadcasting, 
and cable, respectively, each represent a complex, meticulously designed regulatory 
scheme governing the service in question. A plenary power over other communication 
by wire or radio is inconsistent with these intricate congressionally-mandated schemes, 
which is why courts have required the FCC to tie its Title I authority to a specific grant of 
authority within its jurisdictional core.57 Given the Internet‟s prominence and its distance 
from the agency‟s core industries of broadcasting, telephones, and cable, the Court was 
correct to conclude that Congress did not intend the agency to exercise substantial 
regulatory authority under Title I sub silentio through general statements of policy.58  
 
Nor should the level of scrutiny change if the Commission instead reclassifies the 
transmission component of broadband service as a Title II service. Pundits and the 
Commission itself have put forth this possibility as a way to escape the close scrutiny of 
the Comcast decision.59 But the Commission has not historically regulated broadband 
service under Title II, and in fact it has defended the proposition before the Supreme 
Court that broadband service is an unregulated “information service” rather than a Title 
II “telecommunications service.”60 While the transmission component of broadband 
service may fit textually within the statute‟s definition of “telecommunications,” there is 
ample evidence from the statute that the service does not map well onto the Title II 
regulatory scheme. Reclassifying broadband under Title II would subject broadband 
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providers to a host of regulations that were clearly written for telephone companies and 
would be irrelevant at best (and possibly harmful) to the broadband industry. The fact 
that most of Title II clearly pertains to telephones suggests that it is “unlikely” that 
Congress intended its Title II delegation to cover Internet access as well. The 
Commission‟s claims would run afoul of the deregulatory emphasis of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act generally and Section 230 in particular, which emphasizes 
Congress‟s desire that the Internet remain free of regulation.61  
 
The Commission has suggested it could solve this problem by exercising its 
forbearance authority to relieve broadband providers from those portions of Title II that 
would be inappropriate to enforce against the industry.62 But the use of forbearance to 
whittle a comprehensive telephone regulatory scheme into a custom-fit law of the 
Internet suggests that the Commission is venturing dangerously close to the type of 
unbounded regulatory authority that the Midwest Video II and Comcast courts rightly 
feared. The Commission may be correct that broadband transmission resembles 
telephone service and its expertise may be entitled to some deference under Skidmore, 
but the overwhelming statutory evidence suggests that Congress has not (yet) intended 
to give the agency general regulatory authority over broadband, no matter how much 
(as a policy matter) the Commission feels it needs this authority. It would be a mistake 
to defer to the agency‟s conclusion otherwise because of a misappropriation of the 
Chevron doctrine.  
 
 
* Daniel A. Lyons, a member of the Board of Academic Advisors for the Free State 
Foundation, is an Assistant Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. The Free 
State Foundation is a non-partisan Section 501(c)(3) free market-oriented think tank 
located in Rockville, Maryland. 
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